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BOOK REVIEWS

THE EVOLUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY’S FOREIGN POLICY
SINCE THE VIETNAM WAR
Mann, James. The Obamians: The Struggle inside the White House to Redefine American Power. New
York: Viking, 2012. 416pp. $26.95

James Mann walks the reader through
the key foreign-policy challenges
faced by the Barack Obama administration and outlines the evolution
that has taken place in the president’s approach to these issues.
He traces the post-Vietnam history of the Democratic Party’s foreign
policy and describes the three different
generations that come together in the
present administration: the Vietnam
War generation, the post–Vietnam
War generation, and the Obamians,
who are identified by Mann as mostly
campaign staffers, plus National Security Council officials Ben Rhodes
and Denis McDonough. The third
group’s foreign-policy experience is
limited to the Congress, and its political reference points are September
11th, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the
2008–2009 financial crisis. The Vietnam War is ancient history to them.
Mann believes this third group most
closely reflects President Obama’s
own worldview. He notes that foreignpolicy “veterans were to discover that
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Obama relied to an unusual extent
on his own informal network, the
Obamians he had come to trust in the
presidential campaign.” In fact, while
Defense Secretary Bob Gates, National
Security Adviser General Jim Jones,
Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg, and others have moved on, the
core of officials that Mann describes
as Obamians are largely still in place.
Mann describes “two distinctive aspects
of Obama’s foreign policy.” The first is
that Obama is not “squeamish about
employing American military power,”
as the surge in Afghanistan, the war in
Libya, and his campaign expression “to
track down, capture, or kill” all show.
The second is the concern on the part
of both the president and the Obamians
that America’s financial resources no
longer allow the United States to exercise its traditional postwar hegemony.
Instead, they believe that on entering office they were faced with a “continuing
effort to recast the United States’ role
in the world in a way that fit America’s
more limited resources.” Mann notes the
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biggest change for the William Clinton
administration alumni was grasping
this new reality of declining resources.
The author also chronicles some important missteps made by the Obama
administration, arguing that the president’s fixation on not repeating what
the Obamians viewed as mistakes of
the George W. Bush administration led
them to downplay democracy early in
their tenure. This led, in part, to being
overly reticent during Iran’s Green Revolution. Mann also describes how their
initial approach to China was based
on lessons learned during the Clinton
administration. Unfortunately, they did
not recognize that China had become
much more confident during the eight
years of the Bush administration, thereby making their approach ineffective.
Mann spends a significant amount of
the book dealing with Afghanistan and
describing President Obama’s increasing disillusionment with the war.
Afghanistan, for candidate Obama,
was the good war that had to be won.
During the first policy review this
remained the main theme, and the
president, at least implicitly, endorsed
a counterinsurgency strategy. However,
when General Stanley McChrystal’s
appointment as top commander in
Afghanistan set in motion another
review later that same year, President
Obama was “forced to confront the
implications of the counterinsurgency
strategy: How many troops would be
required, and how long would it take?”
President Obama comes into his own,
according to Mann, with the 2011 war
in Libya. Mann states that while Obama
acknowledged the United States has
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little strategic interest in Libya, he also
recognized that our “only . . . strategic
interests on this issue lay in maintaining
strong relationships with close allies.”
Nonetheless, President Obama did not
approve the initial plan for a humanitarian intervention, because his advisers
admitted it was unlikely to work, but
rather pressed for options that would
accomplish the mission. The president then personally worked out the
division of labor among allied forces,
in order to limit U.S. involvement.
Mann, looking back at his book Rise
of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s
War Cabinet (2004), concludes he
was right when he described the
2003 invasion of Iraq as “the outer
limits of the expansion of American
power and ideals.” Mann concludes
that the Obama administration has
been centrist, marking a new era in
America’s relations with the world,
“one in which primacy is not assured.”
The Obamians follows in the path of
such books as Bob Woodward’s Obama’s
Wars, in that it uses background interviews to provide a picture of the Obama
administration’s foreign-policy decision making. While Woodward focuses
on the Afghan-surge decision making,
Mann looks at the evolution of the
Democratic Party’s foreign policy since
Vietnam and then places the Obama
administration within that context. By
doing so, James Mann has produced a
book of value to both specialists and the
general reader, contributing to a better
understanding of the Obama administration’s foreign-policy decision making.
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